This paper considers why a manager would choose to submit himself to the discipline of bank monitoring. This issue is analyzed within the context of a model where the manager enjoys private bene…ts, which can be restricted by the monitor, and is optimally compensated by shareholders. Within this setting, we …nd that managers will submit to monitoring when they receive favorable private information. This result is consistent with event study evidence that suggests that the market has a favorable view of …nancing choices that increase monitoring.
Previous research has analyzed the monitoring role of banks in entrepreneurial models where …rms are managed by their owners. 1 In these models, entrepreneurs relinquish control in favor of a monitor whenever monitoring produces a net gain in …rm value. 2 However in public corporations, where ownership and control are separated, a con ‡ict of interest emerges: the cost of bank monitoring falls largely on management, while the potential gain in value accrues, in principle, to shareholders.
In this paper we examine the case in which shareholders cannot directly control a …rm's investing and …nancing decisions but can o¤er incentive compensation to a¤ect these choices. We characterize the optimal managerial compensation contract and explain why some …rms use bank …nancing while others do not, why the choice of bank …nancing tends to raise the …rm's stock price, and how these price e¤ects can be used by shareholders to induce optimal …nancing decisions.
The managers in our model have a tendency to extract private bene…ts that hurt shareholders. This tendency is a¤ected by the manager's compensation contract and can also be imperfectly controlled by bank monitoring. In our setting, banks reduce the size of the manager's private bene…ts, i.e., managers' temptations to misbehave, and so complement the use of incentive compensation by reducing its cost.
The cost of providing a compensation package that induces the manager to take less private bene…ts also depends on …rm pro…tability, which is not known before the compensation contract is written. We characterize pro…tability as the …rm's probability of success and consider a …rm that can turn out to be one of two types, a type with a high probability of success and a type with a low probability of success. If the …rm turns out to be the high type, then a lower level of incentive pay can be used to induce the manager to submit to bank monitoring and forsake ine¢cient private 1 See, for example, Diamond (1984) , Rajan (1992) , and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) . 2 Say, by inducing more e¢cient investment and liquidation decisions and/or by increasing the …rm's debt capacity.
bene…ts. However, if the …rm turns out to be the low type, then a higher level of incentive pay must be used to induce such a desirable behavior.
Because …rm type is not initially known, shareholders cannot o¤er compensation contracts that are contingent on whether or not the …rm turns out to be the high or low type, therefore, to induce the manager to behave when the …rm turns out to be low shareholders would have to substantially overpay the manager when the …rm turns out to be high. However, as we show, shareholders may be able to induce the high and low type …rms to separate by making the manager's compensation to depend on whether or not he chooses to be monitored by a bank. In particular, we show that two regimes (i.e., combinations of …nancing and incentive contracts) may emerge depending on parameters. In what we will call the separating regime, shareholders o¤er a contract that induces only high pro…tability …rms to use bank …nancing and incentive pay. In the pooling regime, all …rms are attracted to bank …nancing. In this regime, a higher level of incentive pay is employed which generates additional rents to the managers of high pro…tability …rms.
The separating regime can be characterized by an (endogenous) association between the …rms' unobservable pro…tability, bank monitoring, and incentive pay which makes the use of bank …nancing work as a signal of high pro…tability. Thus, this association provides a theoretical rationale for James (1987) result that the announcement of a bank loan agreement produces positive abnormal returns on the borrower's stock. 3 We show that the valuation e¤ects that follow the announcement of …nancing choices allow an intuitive implementation of the optimal contract using market-based compensation.
3 Lummer and McConnell (1989) , as well as Best and Zhang (1993) , argue that the positive market reaction documented by James (1987) only applies to loan renewals. However, with a revised empirical de…nition of new loans, Billet, Flannery, and Gar…nkel (1995) …nd no signi…cant di¤erences between initiations and renewals; the same applies to Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock (1992) and Hadlock and James (2000) .
Our analysis o¤ers predictions both on the size and the direction of the market reaction to the announcement of …nancing choices as well as on the cross-sectional determinants of these choices. Additionally, our results raise novel predictions regarding the links between incentive compensation and …nancing sources. For instance, it is suggested that …rms that use bank …nancing will tend to be characterized by larger pay-performance sensitivities. This paper combines ingredients from two strands of the banking literature. As in the screening models (e.g., Boyd and Prescott (1986) and Diamond (1991) ), a successful credit agreement is good news about the …rm's pro…tability. However our argument does not rely on banks' advantage in evaluating …rms' pro…tability but on the fact that banks perform a monitoring function that managers dislike. This feature brings us close to the monitoring models (e.g., Rajan (1992) , Diamond (1993) , and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) ) which emphasize the role of banks in alleviating moral hazard problems through monitoring.
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Part of our contribution is to show that adding unobservable heterogeneity (private information) to models which had reasonably succeeded in identifying the observable determinants of the use of bank loans allows them to also accommodate the evidence on bank loan announcements.
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Finally, it is worth noting that one can apply the logic of our analysis to other cases where managers voluntarily submit to increased monitoring. Examples include managerial proposals to change governance, accounting, auditing or internal organization whose main consequence is a reduction in the private bene…ts that the managers 4 A third strand of the literature (e.g., Detragiache (1994) and Gorton and Kahn (2000) ) focuses on the role of banks in debt renegotiations and …nancial restructuring following episodes of …nancial distress. These papers o¤er implications consistent with the announcement e¤ects associated with loan renewals among …nancially troubled …rms. Our theory points out to a mechanism whereby the announcement e¤ects may also occur following initiations and among …nancially sound publicly traded …rms.
For a recent empirical study on the observable determinants of the choice between market and bank …nancing, see Cantillo and Wright (2000) . might obtain by deviating from value maximization. 6 Our results provide insights about the type of managerial compensation contracts that one can use to induce these changes and clarify the circumstances in which their announcement is likely to produce stock price responses.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we describe the model. In Section 2 we analyze the optimal contracting problem. Section 3 describes the two di¤erent regimes that may arise and the factors that determine the prevalence of one or the other. In Section 4 we examine the valuation e¤ects of …nancing choices. Section 5 discusses the implementation of the optimal contract through market-based compensation. We discuss the main implications of our analysis in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
1 The Model
Agents, technology, and modes of …nancing
We consider a publicly traded …rm that operates in a risk neutral economy in which the market rate of return is normalized to zero. The …rm is owned by small shareholders and run by a manager. Shareholders and the manager maximize their lifetime pecuniary and non-pecuniary income. The manager has no wealth, is protected by limited liability, and has a zero reservation level of utility.
The …rm has a project which requires an initial investment I and yields a terminal cash ‡ow x = R if it succeeds and x = 0 otherwise.
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The probability of success depends partly on the project's type µ; which identi…es whether its pro…tability is high (µ = µ H ) or low (µ = µ L ), and partly on the manager's "e¤ort" decision e; which 6 Constraints on managerial behavior commonly associated with leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and venture capìtal …nancing are also consistent with this description.
Assuming that the project yields no cash ‡ow in case of failure implies no loss of generality. We could have instead assumed a cash ‡ow k + R if it succeeds and k otherwise.
identi…es whether the manager is diligent (e = 1) or extracts private bene…ts from the project (e = 0). Speci…cally, the distribution of terminal cash ‡ow is x = ( R with probability µ + ¢e; 0 with probability 1 ¡ µ ¡ ¢e;
where
Thus managerial e¤ort (i.e., choosing e = 1 rather than e = 0) produces an expected cash ‡ow gain of ¢R:
We assume, however, that the manager's e¤ort choice is subject to a trade-o¤ since by choosing e = 0 he can extract some private bene…ts C f from the project, where f identi…es whether the project is …nanced by the market (f = m) or by a bank (f = b).
In this respect, we follow the standard view that banks can exert tighter control and better monitoring of managerial discretion than smaller and more dispersed market investors.
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Speci…cally, borrowing from Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) , we assume that
which captures the idea that bank monitoring reduces the ability of the manager to extract private bene…ts from the …rm.
E¢ciency and viability
We assume that, under any of the available modes of …nance, the e¤ort decision that maximizes the project's total return (expected cash ‡ow plus private bene…ts) 8
This view is consistent with the evidence that covenants in private …nancing arrangements, especially bank loans, are typically more abundant and restrictive than in public security issues (see Smith and Warner (1979) and Gilson and Warner (1997) ). It is also consistent with the wisdom that some features of bank …nancing, such as the explicit or implicit conditions governing the renewal of revolving loans and credit lines, impose e¤ective discipline on managerial behavior (see Repullo and Suarez (1998) ).
is e = 1; that is,
We also assume that, even with the lowest pro…tability type and the least favorable e¤ort decision, the project is viable, that is,
Information and contracting
The project's pro…tability type µ is µ L with probability ¹ and µ H with probability 1¡¹:
When the manager is hired, µ is still uncertain. Once in charge, he privately observes µ. Afterwards, he decides on both the …nancing mode f; which is publicly observable, and the e¤ort e; which is not. The cash- ‡ow x, once it realizes, is also publicly observable. Hence the model features an asymmetry of information related to µ and an incentive problem related to f and e. To cope with these problems, shareholders o¤er the manager a contract that maximizes their expected income subject to the relevant participation and incentive compatibility constraints. This contract may make the manager's compensation contingent on the observable variables f and x:
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Notice that, consistent with the discretion that managers enjoy in most publicly traded companies, we have assumed that the manager cannot be obliged to use a particular mode of …nancing. Once in charge, the manager will choose f in order to maximize his own expected income (monetary rewards plus private bene…ts). There is no theoretical reason to rule out the contingency on f. Nevertheless, since it may seem somewhat counterfactual, we will show in Section 5 that the optimal contract can be implemented using a compensation scheme based exclusively on stock market performance.
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Technically, the model is related to Sappington (1983) who analyzes a principal-agent problem in which there are ex-post limits to the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a risk neutral agent.
on f and imposing the use of bank …nancing, since this would reduce the manager's temptation to extract private bene…ts from the …rm.
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To sum up, Figure 1 brie ‡y reviews the timing of events in the model. 
The Manager's Contract
In this section we characterize the optimal managerial contract. We show that such contract may correspond to di¤erent …nancial regimes, that is, di¤erent associations between project types, modes of …nancing, and compensation schemes. Later sections will examine the determinants of the occurrence of each equilibrium regime, the associated valuation e¤ects, and the possibility of using market-based compensation to implement the optimal contract.
11 Zwiebel (1996) and Novaes and Zingales (1997) are other examples in the literature where managerial discretion over capital structure decisions can be harmful to shareholders. One could think in modi…cations of our model in which, in some states of the world, both shareholders and the manager prefer market …nancing to bank …nancing. In such a case it could be suboptimal to force the manager to always use bank …nancing. Aghion and Tirole (1997) present a model of managerial delegation along these lines.
The problem
Shareholders o¤er the manager a contract that maximizes the ex ante value of the …rm net of the cost of managerial compensation. By virtue of the Revelation Principle (Myerson (1979) ), we can characterize such a contract restricting our attention to direct mechanisms whereby the manager, after observing the project's type µ, is induced to truthfully reveal it through an announcement z 2 fµ L ; µ H g: Formally, this announcement appears, together with the …nancing mode f and the e¤ort e; in the triplet (z; f; e) that describes the manager's action. Accordingly, a contract consists of an intended action a(µ) = (µ; f (µ); e(µ)) for each type µ and a compensation scheme w = f(w 0 (z; f ); w R (z; f )); for z = µ L ; µ H and f = m; bg that speci…es some non-negative rewards w x (z; f ) contingent on the announced type z; the chosen …nancing mode f; and the realization of x:
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The optimal contract solves:
is the value of type-µ …rm to its shareholders under action a and the compensation scheme w; and
We assume that even with x = 0 the manager can receive positive compensation. The …rm could ful…ll that commitment by "saving funds" before the realization of x occurs.
is the manager's expected utility (monetary rewards plus private bene…ts) in a type-µ …rm under action a and the compensation scheme w: The constraints of this problem are the self-selection or incentive compatibility conditions required to induce the manager to follow a(µ) under each µ.
Note that the manager's participation constraints have been ignored since they are trivially satis…ed. In particular, the manager's reservation utility is zero but, given the non-negativity of w; he can always guarantee himself an expected utility (in private bene…ts) of at least C m > 0 by just choosing (f; e) = (m; 0):
The solution
Conditional on self-selection, each type has four possible pairs of actions (f; e) 2 fm; bg £ f0; 1g. Hence, the two types produce 4 2 = 16 possible combinations of
Each of these combinations will be called an allocation in order to signify that, once such combination is …xed, the …rm's surplus under each µ is also …xed so the compensation scheme w only a¤ects the distribution of such a surplus between shareholders and the manager.
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For future reference, Table   1 enumerates all possible allocations. Table 1 Possible allocations
Note that V (a; w; µ) + U(a; w; µ) = (µ + ¢e)R + (1 ¡ e)C f :
Candidate allocations
Instead of exploring the implementation and the ex ante shareholder value of each allocation, we provide some results that reduce the number of potentially optimal allocations to just three. The …rst result refers to the requirements of incentive compatibility under a given …nancing mode. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 If a compensation scheme induces the …nancing choice f (µ) under project type µ; then a necessary and su¢cient condition for inducing e(µ) = 1 is
To explain this result, think of the LHS of (9) as the bonus that the manager of a project of type µ under the mode of …nance f (µ) receives when the project succeeds. Then (9) simply says that the bonus should be high enough to guarantee that the increase in the manager's compensation due to choosing e = 1 rather than e = 0 exceeds the private bene…ts that the manager could have extracted by choosing
Proposition 2 Allocations in which bank …nancing is associated with low powered incentives (i.e., (f (µ); e(µ)) = (b; 0) for some µ) or market …nancing with high powered incentives (i.e., (f (µ); e(µ)) = (m; 1) for some µ) are suboptimal.
This result excludes all allocations in rows 2 and 3 and columns 2 and 3 of Table   1 (namely, A2, A3, A5-A8, A9-A12, A14 and A15). It establishes the association of bank …nancing with high powered incentives and of market …nancing with low powered incentives. These associations re ‡ect that the reduction in private bene…ts brought about by bank monitoring is worthy if the manager is to be induced to exert his e¤ort (since lower private bene…ts makes him less resistant to do so) but it is worthless otherwise. Actually, given that the manager can always get C m with (f; e) = (m; 0); implementing (f; e) = (b; 0) would be wasteful since it would oblige shareholders to pecuniarily compensate the manager (out of a non-larger expected cash ‡ow) for the dissipated private bene…ts C m ¡ C b :
Proposition 3 Allocations in which low pro…tability projects receive high powered incentives, e(µ L ) = 1; while high pro…tability projects receive low powered incentives,
This result excludes A13 as well as A5, A7, and A15 (which were already excluded by Proposition 2) and establishes that it is never optimal to provide higher powered incentives to a low pro…tability …rm than to a high pro…tability one. To explain this, notice that, for a given e¤ort choice, a µ H project is always more likely to succeed than a µ L project. So a bonus that convinces the manager of a µ L project to contribute his e¤ort can also convince, at no extra cost, the manager of a µ H project to do so, which would certainly increase shareholder value.
The joint consideration of Propositions 2 and 3 reveals an association between incentive pay, bank monitoring, and high pro…tability projects. Importantly this association does not come from any assumed technological complementarity between bank …nancing and the high pro…tability project since, as it is clear from (1) and (3), neither the marginal e¤ect of e on cash ‡ows nor the e¤ects of f on the manager's potential private bene…ts depend on µ. The association comes from the interactions between the private information problem and the moral hazard problem that emerge in the design of the optimal contract. Therefore, we are left with three possibly optimal allocations: the market-market allocation or mm (A1), the market-bank allocation or mb (A4), and the bank-bank allocation or bb (A16).
Implementing the candidate allocations
To simplify the presentation we will focus on the case in which, even with a high pro…tability project, inducing the manager to choose bank …nancing entails some extra compensation cost (beyond what would be required to implement e = 1 under a non-discretionary f ). This case occurs when C m is su¢ciently larger than C b ; speci…cally when
which strengthens (3).
14 Assuming (10), we will …rst characterize the minimum cost compensation schemes w mb and w bb that implement mb and bb; respectively, and then establish the dominance of mb over mm:
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The characterized schemes share three features. First, their rewards w x (z; f ) do not vary with z; that is, the implementation of mb and bb does not require compensation that explicitly depends on the announcement of the project's type.
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Type separation in mb is attained by making rewards di¤er across …nancing choices. Second, when f (µ) = b the proposed schemes leave the manager an expected pecuniary reward of at least C m ; the value of the private bene…ts which he sacri…ces by not choosing e = 0: Third, the rewards that follow the choice of f = m are always zero for at least one of the following reasons: because otherwise the choice of market 14 To obtain (10), suppose that f(µ H ) = b could be guaranteed at no cost. The cheapest contract that implements e(µ H ) = 1 would then set, by Proposition 1, w 0 (µ H ; b) = 0 and w R (µ H ; b) = Cb ¢ and the expected utility of a manager with a µ H project who chooses (f; e) = (b; 1) would then be (µ H + ¢) C b ¢ : However, if (10) holds, such a utility would be lower than the private bene…ts obtainable with (f; e) = (0; m): But then implementing f(µ H ) = b will indeed require some additional compensation.
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Covering the case in which (10) does not hold would require a slight generalization of Propositions 4 and 5 below. Qualitatively the solution to the optimal contract problem does not change, except that if C m is close to ¢R there may be cases in which the second best choice of e becomes trivially zero for both types. In such cases, the dominance of mb over mm does not follow. 16 The compensation schemes w mb and w bb are the unique minimum-cost schemes among the class of z-invariant schemes that implement mb and bb, respectively. For each of these allocations, however, there is a continuum of alternative minimum-cost compensation schemes in which rewards vary with z. For simplicity, but without loss of generality, the analysis below focuses on w 
and w 0 (z; m) = w R (z; m) = 0; for z = µ L ; µ H ; implements the market-bank allocation at the minimum cost.
The scheme w bb corresponds to a pooling regime in which the managers of both types of projects are attracted to bank …nancing, but those with a µ L project receive expected rewards of just C m while those with a µ H project receive
and w 0 (z; m) = w R (z; m) = 0; for z = µ L ; µ H ; implements the bank-bank allocation at the minimum cost.
received by the manager of the µ H project is due to
since the manager can obtain C m by choosing (f; e) = (m; 0): Further, inducing
Now, suppose the manager of a µ H project announces µ L and chooses (f; e) = (b; 1):
Then, (11) and (12) imply that his expected payo¤ will amount at least
given the greater chances of success of his project and the presence of a positive bonus. The extra rent can be reduced to its minimum by making (11) and (12) Finally, we show that the mm allocation is dominated by the mb allocation.
Indeed, notice that mm can be implemented at a zero compensation cost by setting w x (z; f ) = 0 for all x; z, and f . So it can generate an ex ante value of
However w mb implements e = 1 with the µ H project at a compensation cost of just C m so mb generates an additional positive value for shareholders
Equilibrium Regimes
We now discuss the choice between the two potentially optimal …nancial regimes identi…ed in the previous section: the market-bank regime (associated with the mb allocation and the w mb scheme) and the bank-bank regime ( associated with the bb allocation and the w bb scheme).
The market-bank regime
In the mb regime, the manager of a low pro…tability project resorts to market …nanc-ing, is not subject to monitoring, receives a ‡at reward pro…le, and extracts private bene…ts at the cost of the project's probability of success. In contrast, the manager of a high pro…tability project resorts to bank …nancing, is monitored by the bank, receives incentive pay, and refrains from extracting private bene…ts at the cost of the project's probability of success. As a consequence, a low pro…tability project succeeds with probability µ L whereas a high pro…tability project succeeds with probability µ H + ¢: The cost of the manager's compensation is zero with µ L and C m with µ H . The resulting ex ante value of the …rm to shareholders is
where the …rst term is the expected cash ‡ow obtainable without managerial e¤ort and the second is the expected cash ‡ow (net of compensation costs) due to inducing e(µ H ) = 1:
The bank-bank regime
In the bb regime, the manager resorts to bank …nancing irrespectively of his project's type, receives incentive pay, and refrains from extracting private bene…ts at the cost of the project's probability of success. As a result, low and high pro…tability projects succeed with probability µ L + ¢ and µ H + ¢; respectively. The cost of the manager's compensation is C m with µ L and
with µ H . Hence the ex ante value of the …rm to shareholders is
which adds up the expected cash ‡ow without managerial e¤ort and the expected cash ‡ow (net of compensation costs) due to now inducing e(µ L ) = e(µ H ) = 1.
Comparison of regimes
A glance at the expressions for V mb 0
and V bb 0 makes it clear that the bb regime produces a larger gross expected cash ‡ow than the mb regime, but at the cost of a higher compensation to the manager. Producing an extra ¢R under µ L (i.e., with probability ¹) implies not only paying an extra C m to the manager in that case (which, absent other costs, would always be worthy) but also paying him an extra (µ H ¡ µ L )
e., with probability 1 ¡ ¹). Hence, the di¤erence
may be positive or negative. In particular, it becomes negative when ¹ ! 0 and
is monotonically increasing in ¹; we obtain the following result:
Proposition 6 If the probability of holding a low pro…tability project, ¹; is below a critical level ¹ c 2 (0; 1); the market-bank regime is optimal; otherwise, the bank-bank regime is optimal.
Intuitively, shareholders' choice between the mb regime and the bb regime is driven by the underlying private information problem. When shareholders opt for the separation of types, they lose on production e¢ciency if the project's pro…tability is low, but save on compensation costs if it is high. So the mb regime is worthy insofar as the probability of holding a low pro…tability project is below the threshold ¹ c .
The comparative statics of the threshold ¹ c is as follows. On the one hand, ¹ c is reduced by factors that increase the direct surplus associated with using bank …nancing in the low pro…tability project. These include increases in the e¢ciency gains associated with the managerial e¤ort, ¢ and R; and decreases in the incremental private bene…ts obtainable under market …nancing, C m (which makes the manager less reluctant to submit himself to bank monitoring). On the other hand, ¹ c is raised by factors that exacerbate the asymmetries of information and/or increase the extra rent received by the manager of a high pro…tability project in the bb regime.
These include increases in the private bene…ts obtainable under bank monitoring, C b
(which increases the leverage required to provide incentives under bank …nancing), and increases in the di¤erence in pro…tability across project types, µ H ¡ µ L (which increases the manager's gain due to such leverage). We postpone to Section 6 further discussion of the empirical implications of these results.
On the possibility of renegotiation
The …nancial regimes mb and bb emerge under the implicit assumption that their supporting compensation schemes w mb and w bb ; respectively, will not be renegotiated. However, optimal screening mechanisms frequently require some degree of commitment on the part of the principal. Without such a commitment, if the optimal mechanism produces some ex-post ine¢ciency, both parties can ex-post try to renegotiate the ine¢ciency away.
Here we examine the robustness of mb and bb to the possibility of renegotiating the manager's compensation scheme once the project's pro…tability type µ has been truthfully revealed. The analysis of regime bb is straighforward. Under our assumptions, the choice of (f; e) = (b; 1) is ex post e¢cient irrespectively of µ, so we can conclude that bb is renegotiation proof.
The analysis of the mb regime is less straighforward. The rewards in w mb imply that if the project's pro…tability type is low, the manager chooses f = m. However, after observing this choice, shareholders might want to modify the manager's rewards so as to induce e = 1. Two di¤erent possibilities arise. If the choice of f is reversible, the rewards in w bb would su¢ce to induce the shift to (f; e) = (b; 1) at the minimum cost to shareholders. However, if this renegotiation is anticipated, the high type will …nd this renegotiated rewards more desirable than his original ones in w mb so type separation will not be sustainable.
Alternatively, if the choice of f is not reversible (say, because public securities have been issued and they are costly to retire from the market), shareholders can induce the choice of e = 1 at a minimum cost by o¤ering w 0 = 0 and w R = C m =¢ to the manager. However, it is possible that the cost of these new rewards outweigh the induced expected cash ‡ow gains, in which case the renegotiation will not go through.
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If this were not the case, the manager with a high type project would again …nd the modi…ed rewards more attractive than those in w mb so type separation would collapse.
In conclusion, sustaining mb may require the commitment from shareholders not to renegotiate the manager's compensation package. Absent such a commitment, type separation will generally be harder to obtain.
The Valuation E¤ects of the Financing Decision
Private information in ‡uences the main results of the model. When the managerial contract is designed, shareholders know that the manager's …nancing decision f will be based on his observation of project type µ. The regimes mb and bb di¤er fundamentally in the information revealed to shareholders through f . In bb the …nancing decision is identical for the two types, hence it does not reveal any information. In contrast, in mb the …nancing decision varies with project type, so the market value of the …rm may change at the announcement of f . Therefore a necessary and su¢cient condition to observe valuation e¤ects in equilibrium is the prevalence of the mb regime.
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Suppose the mb regime is indeed optimal. Then, when the manager chooses market …nancing, shareholders learn that the project is of type µ L whose optimal contract 17 The new rewards cost, on average, (µ L + ¢)
Cm ¢ under a low type project, while the induced expected cash ‡ow gain is ¢R. Our assumptions do not imply any ordering between these two quantities.
The conditions under which this regime prevails have been described in Proposition 6. induces e(µ L ) = 0 and speci…es zero rewards to the manager. Hence, their valuation of the …rm shifts to:
where the subscript m identi…es the observed …nancing choice. Alternatively, if the manager chooses bank …nancing, shareholders learn that the project is of type µ H whose optimal contract induces e(µ L ) = 1 and speci…es rewards to the manager with an expected value of C m . Hence, their valuation of the …rm shifts to:
Note that V These valuation e¤ects can be quanti…ed using (13), (16), and (17):
Recall assumption (10).
Thus, the size of the positive (negative) reaction to bank (market) …nancing is directly proportional to the di¤erence between the net expected cash ‡ow generated by high and low pro…tability types, V mb b ¡ V mb m (which is the quantity that appears in square brackets), and to the ex ante probability that the project is of the low (high) pro…tability type.
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So the positive market response to bank loans becomes quantitatively more signi…cant as ¹ · ¹ c approaches the critical value ¹ c (above which bb replaces mb). Changes in ¢, R, and the di¤erence µ H ¡ µ L relate positively with the size of the response, while C m a¤ects it negatively. We discuss further the empirical implications of these results in Section 6.
Another Role for Market-based Compensation
So far we have assumed that contracts contingent upon the mode of …nancing chosen by the manager are enforceable. However, in practice, it is unusual to observe managerial contracts with rewards directly dependent on the manager's …nancing choices.
In this section we show that the direct contractibility on f is not necessary for the implementation of the compensation schemes associated with the optimal …nancial regimes. The market reaction associated with the announcement of f can be used to implement the optimal contracts by means of market-based compensation.
Consider …rst the market-bank regime. The compensation scheme w While the positive reaction to bank …nancing seems consistent with abnormal returns observed at the announcement of bank loans, the negative reaction to market …nancing has a less obvious empirical counterpart. It is clearly consistent with the well-documented negative response to public equity issuance as well as with Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Patel (2000) , who document a negative response to initial public debt o¤erings. if the project succeeds. Thus, choosing e = 0, his expected utility will be:
while, choosing e = 1; it will be:
which happens to be identical to the previous one. Hence ifμ = µ L the manager strictly prefers (f; e) = (m; 0) to any other alternative, whereas ifμ = µ H the manager is indi¤erent between the choices (m; 0), (b; 0) and (b; 1); which are all preferred to (m; 1):
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So the intended allocation is implemented with the described compensation package.
To complete the proof that the market-bank regime can be implemented using a compensation package based exclusively on stock market performance, it is immediate to check that such a compensation package has an expected cost identical to the compensation scheme referred in Proposition 4.
Consider next the implementation of the bank-bank regime. In this case the compensation package will establish that:
² If at t = 2 the …rm's stock does not depreciate the manager receives
(b) a reward in non-transferable shares entitling him to a fraction s =
of the cash ‡ow of the …rm at t = 3.
² If the stock price falls the manager receives no reward.
The main di¤erence with respect to the mb regime is that now using market …nanc-ing is an out-of-the-equilibrium choice for the manager. We can, however, reasonably assume that investors believe that the manager is equally likely to deviate under the two possible values of µ. Clearly, after such a deviation, and because the compensation scheme is either ‡at (if the value of the …rm falls) or not levered enough to provide incentives under market …nancing (if it remains at V bb 0 ), the manager's optimal e¤ort choice would be e = 0; irrespectively of µ. Accordingly, after the deviation, the market value of the company would fall from V bb 0 (see equation (14)) to 21 To break this indi¤erence in favor of (b; 1) one can simply increase a little bit the award of shares associated with the required stock price appreciation.
[¹µ L + (1 ¡ ¹)µ H ]R < V bb 0 : But this is enough for the manager not to have incentives to deviate from his intended course of action under the proposed market-based compensation package.
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The main implication of these decentralization results is that if the complexity of the …nancing decisions corresponding to our variable f impedes contracting directly on them, contracting on market performance may be a good substitute. In particular, the stock market reaction to bank …nancing may become the means for providing incentives to the manager and, consequently, attaining the gains in value that the reaction re ‡ects.
Discussion of the Results
We organize the discussion of our results in two parts. First, we comment on the implications of private information and the e¤ectiveness of bank monitoring for the choice of bank …nancing and its announcement e¤ects, comparing our model with its main theoretical alternative: a model in which banks play a pure certi…cation role.
Second, we comment on the linkages between managerial compensation and …nancing decisions (and, more generally, between governance and managerial submission to monitoring) that our theory unveils.
Private information and the role of banks
In our model the problem of inducing managers to submit to bank monitoring is fundamentally a¤ected by private information: it makes it costly to attract the managers of low pro…tability …rms to the bank. This private information cost may drive shareholders into the separating mb regime, where low pro…tability …rms are kept 22 In addition, one can immediately check that the proposed package has an expected cost identical to the compensation scheme referred in Proposition 5.
away from bank …nancing and the announcement e¤ects of bank loans follow.
The outcome in mb resembles that of a model in which banks play a certi…cation role: high pro…tability …rms are willing to incur the bank certi…cation cost, while low pro…tability …rms are not. In such a model, as in ours, bank loan announcements would be followed by positive stock market reactions. However, other implications di¤er substantially across this model and ours. For instance, in a pure certi…cation setting a less severe informational asymmetry (i.e., a lower spread of pro…tability types, µ H ¡ µ L ) would reduce the use of bank …nancing. In our model, in contrast, having a lower type spread reduces the cost of attracting the managers to banks so it makes bank …nancing more widespread.
A recent paper by Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam (1999) that examines the relative use of private and public …nancing in US corporations, o¤ers evidence consistent with our model. In fact, they …nd no evidence that a higher degree of informational asymmetry (measured either by the standard deviation of the market model residuals or by …rm age) is associated with a greater use of private …nancing.
Moreover, they …nd that, when the private information problem is severe, …rms with positive private information about their future (identi…ed as those experiencing positive abnormal earnings after their …nancing) are more inclined to use bank …nancing.
Notice that their …rst …nding goes against the main prediction of the pure screening model, but it would certainly be consistent with our model if some …rms in their sample operate in the bb regime and others in the mb regime.
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Their second …nding suggests a logic consistent with our mb regime: only when the private information problem is severe enough the use of bank …nancing becomes a signal of good future performance.
This is because the degree of asymmetric information is positively correlated with the incidence of mb and thereby with a less frequent use of private …nancing.
Another di¤erence between the implications of a pure certi…cation model and of our analysis emerges by examining the e¤ects of the degree of asymmetric information on the average stock price response to bank loans. In our model, larger informational asymmetries make shareholders less prone to induce the low pro…tability …rms to use bank monitoring, thereby making the use of bank loans a stronger signal of high pro…tability. In the pure certi…cation model, a composition e¤ect would work in exactly the opposite direction: larger informational asymmetries would make …rms of intermediate pro…tability also willing to incur the certi…cation cost, and hence could make, on average, the use of bank …nancing a weaker signal of high pro…tability. Consistent with our results, the evidence shows a positive relationship between the degree of asymmetric information and the size of the announcement e¤ects. For instance, Best and Zhang (1993) show that …rms with a greater dispersion in analysts' earning forecasts tend to experience larger stock price run-ups at the announcement of a new bank loan. Likewise, Billet, Flannery, and Gar…nkel (1995) …nd that the reaction to new bank loans is positively correlated with the idiosyncratic component of borrowers' stock returns. Improvements in bank e¤ectiveness will also have di¤erent implications in our model than they would in a pure certi…cation model. In the latter, more e¤ective banks would provide a better selection of bank borrowers, thus their loans should be associated with larger positive stock market reactions. In our model, if banks are more e¤ective in ameliorating the moral hazard problem (so that in their presence managers' potential private bene…ts C b are lower), the average stock market reaction to bank loans is smaller. In fact all …rms, irrespectively of their pro…tability type, will opt for bank …nancing in which case no market reaction to bank loans would be observed. Hence we will expect a larger reaction to bank …nancing among …rms for which banks are comparatively less e¤ective monitors. 24 
Governance and managerial submission to monitoring
The implementation of mb and bb using stock based managerial compensation allows us to o¤er novel predictions relative to the correlation between …nancing choices and managerial compensation. Particularly, our results imply a positive cross-sectional correlation between the responsiveness of the market to …nancing choices (present in mb but not in bb) and the sensitivity of managerial pay to performance (larger in mb than in bb). In addition, pay-performance sensitivity should be larger among …rms that rely more on bank …nancing. These predictions, however, emerge from the contract that maximizes ex ante shareholder value so they would apply to …rms whose governance system works reasonably well. With poor governance, we should expect less submission to bank monitoring and lower pay-performance sensitivities.
As far as we know, no empirical study has related bank monitoring with managerial compensation and governance. However, if we accept leverage as a proxy for the intensity of monitoring, the evidence in Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) seems consistent with the predictions of our model. These authors examine the relationship between leverage and some proxies of managerial entrenchment (presumably related to the quality of governance). They report that leverage (in our interpretation, the degree of managers' "submission to monitoring") is positively correlated with payperformance sensitivity, is lower when CEOs are entrenched, and increases in the aftermath of entrenchment-reducing shocks. This prediction is consistent with Bayless and Chaplinsky (1991) , who …nd that …rms which are ex ante less likely to use bank loans are those receiving a more positive reaction at the announcement, and with Hadlock and James (2000) , who …nd that the reaction is only signi…cant among …rms with public debt outstanding, that is, those for which banks revealed less attractive in the past.
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From a monitoring viewpoint, what probably matters is not the payo¤ structure of the security issued (i.e., debt versus equity) but whether it is held privately or publicly. In this respect, Wruck (1989) shows that, in contrast with the negative market reaction to public equity placements, private Despite we emphasize the relationship between governance, compensation, and the managerial submission to monitoring present in the choice of bank loans, the logic of our analysis may extend to other managerial decisions with a similar impact on the subsequent incentive problem. These include any managerial proposal of changes in …nancing, governance, accounting, auditing or internal organization that reduce the private bene…ts that managers could obtain by deviating from value maximization.
A prominent example of such type of proposals are LBOs which, in line with our predictions, frequently entail the introduction of both greater discipline through debt and explicit incentive pay for the managers. Our analysis suggests that LBOs would tend to follow the reception by managers of favorable information about their …rms and would support the wisdom that part of the LBO cash ‡ow improvement is due to enhanced incentives but another part is the result of reverse causation.
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Another relevant example may be venture capital …nancing, especially when the presence of sizeable private bene…ts or large …nancing needs implies that the founder entrepreneur looks more like a manager than like an owner (i.e., holds an important stake in the private bene…ts associated with a poor management but only a small fraction of the residual cash ‡ows produced by a good management). In the logic of our separating regime, the resort to a …nancier, such as a venture capitalist, who is able to monitor the entrepreneur would identify the entrepreneurs with relatively better projects.
Concluding Remarks
We have examined the determinants of the use of bank …nancing in a novel setting. In our model there is a separation between ownership and control. Managers enjoy full equity placements associate with a positive market reaction.
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See Grinblatt and Titman (1998), pp. 685-687. discretion on both investment and …nancing decisions so inducing managers to submit themselves to the discipline of bank …nancing requires a proper incentive contract.
The design of the incentive contract that shareholders would wish to o¤er to managers is fundamentally a¤ected by the existence of private information concerning …rms' pro…tability. To induce managers of both high and low pro…tability …rms to choose bank …nancing requires the managers of the high pro…tability …rms to capture additional informational rents. These rents can be reduced by o¤ering separating contracts that induce high pro…tability …rms to choose bank …nancing and low pro…tabil-ity …rms to choose market …nancing. We have shown that when the asymmetries of information are substantial, separating contracts are optimal. We have also provided an intuitive implementation of the optimal separating contract through market-based compensation.
The optimal separating contract identi…es one of the paper's main …ndings: an association between …rm pro…tability, high powered managerial incentives, and bank …nancing. While the association between managerial incentives and bank …nancing is a central theme in the literature on bank monitoring, the association between them and …rm pro…tability relates entirely to the private information e¤ect identi…ed here. The triple-sided association is consistent with the event study evidence on the positive stock market reaction to bank loan announcements and leads to novel empirical predictions about the linkage between …nancing choices and managerial compensation.
Although the core of our discussion has focused on the case of bank …nancing, the logic of our theory may help understand the signalling value of other instances of managerial submission to greater discipline such as LBOs and venture capital …nancing. These choices may indeed have a direct impact on cash ‡ows, but our analysis suggests that part of investors' positive reaction to them may be due to the fact that, under the proper compensation scheme, the managers of the …rms with the best unobservable pro…tability prospects are the most willing to be monitored.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Under a given …nancing mode f (µ); inducing e(µ) = 1 requires the manager's utility with e = 1;
(1 ¡ µ ¡ ¢)w 0 (µ; f (µ)) + (µ + ¢)w R (µ; f (µ)); to be at least as large as with e = 0;
Such a condition is equivalent to (9).¥ Proof of Proposition 2. This proof has two parts. Both are done by contradiction.
We start with a proposed allocation which is implemented at a minimum cost by some Notice …rst that, by Proposition 1,
Thus, for su¢ciently small "; w 0 implements (f (µ j ); e(µ j )) = (f (µ i ); e(µ i )) = (b; 1):
Moreover, relative to w 0 ; this contract saves an amount (µ k + ¢)" on compensation for type j: For type i there are two cases to consider. 
whereas
Consider an alternative contract w 0 with components w
for all x and z; and w 0 x (z; f ) = 0 for all x; z, and f 6 = f L : Clearly this contract implements (f; e) = (f L ; 1) for type L; but also for type H: To see this, notice that, by Proposition 1, (20) su¢ces for e = 1 if f (µ H ) = f L ; but this is the case since, given (20), the payo¤ associated with f = f L is increasing in µ; while that associated with f 6 = f L is ‡at. Therefore, for type H; w so his intended action can be implemented. Similarly, the choice of (µ H ; b; 1) under µ H is guaranteed by the fact that the manager's utility under such choice is greater than under the best market-…nancing alternatives, (µ L ; m; 0) and (µ H ; m; 0):
Thus, w bb de…nitely implements bb. : But then, the absence of private bene…ts when e(µ H ) = 1 implies that the expected payment to the manager under µ H cannot be
. This is precisely the cost of w bb under µ H ; so there is no room for improvement on this dimension either.¥ Proof of Propositions 6-7. These propositions are proved by the arguments that precede them in the text.
